Defending against Whitebox Adversarial Attacks via Randomized
  Discretization by Zhang, Yuchen & Liang, Percy
Defending against Whitebox Adversarial Attacks
via Randomized Discretization
Yuchen Zhang Percy Liang
yuczhan@microsoft.com
Microsoft Corporation
Berkeley, CA 94704, USA
pliang@cs.stanford.edu
Computer Science Department
Stanford University, CA 94305, USA
Abstract
Adversarial perturbations dramatically de-
crease the accuracy of state-of-the-art image
classifiers. In this paper, we propose and ana-
lyze a simple and computationally efficient de-
fense strategy: inject random Gaussian noise,
discretize each pixel, and then feed the result
into any pre-trained classifier. Theoretically,
we show that our randomized discretization
strategy reduces the KL divergence between
original and adversarial inputs, leading to a
lower bound on the classification accuracy of
any classifier against any (potentially white-
box) `∞-bounded adversarial attack. Empiri-
cally, we evaluate our defense on adversarial
examples generated by a strong iterative PGD
attack. On ImageNet, our defense is more ro-
bust than adversarially-trained networks and
the winning defenses of the NIPS 2017 Adver-
sarial Attacks & Defenses competition.
1 Introduction
Machine learning models have achieved impressive suc-
cess in diverse tasks, but many of them are sensitive
to small perturbations of the input. Recent studies
show that adversarially constructed perturbations, even
if inperceptibly small, can dramatically decrease the
accuracy of state-of-the-art models in image classifica-
tion [37, 12, 18, 22], face recognition [34], robotics [25],
speech recognition [7] and malware detection [3]. Such
vulnerability exposes security concerns and begs for a
more reliable way to build ML systems.
Many techniques have been proposed to robustify mod-
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Figure 1: (a) The original image. (b) Pixel distribution
in the a-b axes of the Lab color space, which has a clus-
ter structure. (c) Output of randomized discretization.
els for image classification. A mainstream approach
is to train the model on adversarial examples (also
known as adversarial training) [12, 33, 19, 24, 38]. Ad-
versarial training has proven successful in defending
against adversarial attacks on small images, especially
on MNIST and CIFAR-10 [24]. However, training on
large-scale image classification tasks remains an open
challenge. On ImageNet, Kurakin et al. [19] report that
adversarial training yields a robust classifier against
the FGSM attack, but adversarial training fails for
the stronger iterative PGD attack. Other efforts to
robustify the model through retraining, including mod-
ifying the network [32], regularization [8] and data
augmentation [29, 42, 8] have not shown to improve
over adversarial training on ImageNet.
Another family of defenses do not require retraining.
These defenses pre-process the image with a transforma-
tion and then call a pre-trained classifier to classify the
image. For example, the JPEG compression [11], image
re-scaling [23, 40], feature squeezing [41], quilting [15]
and neural-based transformations [14, 26, 21, 35] are
found to be effective in mitigating blackbox attacks.
Compared to retraining defenses, these defenses are
computationally efficient and easy to integrate with pre-
trained classifiers. However, since they are not crafted
against whitebox attacks, their robustness rarely holds
against adversaries who have full knowledge of the
transformation (see [5, 2] and Section 5.2 of this pa-
per).
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Defending against Whitebox Adversarial Attacks
In this paper, we present a defense that is specifically
designed to work against whitebox attacks without
retraining. Our approach, randomized discretization (or
RandDisc), adds Gaussian noise to each pixel, replaces
each pixel with the closest cluster center, and feeds
the transformed image to any pre-trained classifier.
Figure 1 illustrates the intuition: Image pixels in the
color space often cluster. For pixels close to a particular
cluster center, their cluster assignments will be stable
under perturbations, and thus robust to the adversarial
attack. For pixels that are roughly equidistant from two
centers, their cluster assignments will be randomized
by the injection of Gaussian noise, which also mitigates
the effect of the adversarial attack.
As argued in previous work [30, 39], the gold stan-
dard for security is having a certificate that a de-
fense provably works against all attacks. In this work,
we prove such a lower bound on the accuracy based
on information-theoretic arguments: Randomized dis-
cretization reduces the KL divergence between the
clean image and the adversarial image. If the two dis-
tributions are close enough, then from an information-
theoretic point of view, no algorithm can distinguish
the two transformed images. Thus, the adversary can-
not perturb the image to make significant modifications
to the induced distribution over the classifier’s output.
Previous defenses with robustness certificates [30, 39]
require retraining and are feasible only on small-scale
models. In contrast, our defense requires no retraining
and works on top any pre-existing model.
Empirically, we evaluate a defense’s whitebox robust-
ness by performing the iterative projected gradient de-
scent (PGD) attack [24]. If the model is differentiable,
then we generate adversarial examples by maximizing
its cross-entropy via PGD directly. Since RandDisc is
non-differentiable, we define a differentiable approxima-
tion of it called randomized mixture (or RandMix). We
generate adversarial examples by attacking RandMix,
then use these examples to evaluate the robustness of
both RandDisc and RandMix.
Our experiments show that randomized discretization
significantly improves a classifier’s robustness. On the
MNIST dataset, our defense combined with a vanilla
CNN achieves 94.4% accuracy on perturbations of `∞-
norm  = 0.1, whereas the vanilla CNN achieves only
12.0% accuracy without the defense. In addition, the
certified accuracy of the defense is consistently higher
than the empirical accuracy of the model without the
defense.
We also tested our approach on the subset of Ima-
geNet used by the NIPS 2017 Adversarial Attacks &
Defenses challenge [20]. When integrated with a vanilla
InceptionResNet model, RandDisc achieves superior
robustness compared to other transformation-based
defenses [11, 41, 15, 40]. Its accuracy under the PGD
attack is 3–5 times higher than the adversarially-trained
InceptionResNet model [38]. Finally, we evaluate our
defenses on the adversarial examples generated by the
top 3 attacks according to the competition leaderboard.
Compared to the top 3 winning defenses, our defense
obtains at least 18% higher accuracy on average and
at least 35% higher accuracy against the worst-case
attack (for each defense).
2 Background
Let x be an image with n pixels. The i-th pixel is
represented by xi ∈ Rq, where q is the number of
channels (1 for grayscale, 3 for color). Let x′ denote
the corresponding adversarially perturbed image, which
we assume to be  close to x′ in `∞: ‖x− x′‖∞ ≤ .
Earlier work has developed various of ways to defend
against `∞-norm attacks [12, 24, 38, 42, 20].
Projected gradient descent (PGD) [24] is an efficient
algorithm to perform the `∞-norm attack. Given a
classifier and its loss function L, The PGD computes
iterative update:
xt+1 ← Π
(
xt + η · sign(∇xL(xt))
)
. (1)
Here, η is the step size, and Π(·) is the projection
into the `∞-ball {u : ‖u− x‖∞ ≤ }. If we set η = 
and run PGD for only one iteration, then it is called
the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [12]. Since
PGD is a stronger attack than FGSM in the whitebox
setting [19, 18, 6, 10], we use PGD (that maximizes
cross-entropy) to generate adversarial examples.
We briefly mention other attacks: The Jacobian
saliency map attack [28] corrupts the image by modify-
ing a small fraction of pixels. The DeepFool attack [27]
computes the minimal perturbation necessary for mis-
classification under the L2-norm. Carlini et al. [6] define
an `∞ attack, which can be viewed as running PGD
to maximize a different loss, but its effect is similar to
maximizing the cross-entropy loss [24, 15].
3 Stochastic transformations
In this section, we present three defenses based on
stochastic transformations of the image: Gaussian
randomization (Gaussian), randomized discretization
(RandDisc), and randomized mixture (RandMix). The
later two defenses can be viewed as adding a (poten-
tially stochastic) filter on top of the Gaussian ran-
domization. Each of these stochastic transformations
produces an image x˜ with the same size and the same
semantics as x, so we can feed it directly into any base
classifier and return the resulting label.
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Gaussian randomization. The Gaussian random-
ization defense simply adds Gaussian noise to raw pixels
of the image. Given an image x, it constructs a noisy
image x˜ such that
x˜i = xi + wi where wi ∼ N (0, σ2I).
Randomized discretization. The randomized dis-
cretization (RandDisc) defense first adds Gaussian
noise to each pixel and then discretizes each based on
a finite number of cluster centers. To define these clus-
ters, we randomly sample s indices (i1, . . . , is) ∈ [n]s
with replacement. Then we construct random vectors
b := (b1, . . . , bs) such that
bj := xij + εj where εj ∼ N (0, τ2I).
We then use any selection algorithm to select k cluster
centers c := (c1, . . . , ck) from b. For example, it could
draw k points from b using the k-means++ initializa-
tion [1], or simply define c independent of b.
Once the cluster centers are chosen, we substitute each
pixel by one of the centers:
x˜i = r(xi|c) := argmin
c∈{c1,...,ck}
‖xi + wi − c‖2, (2)
In other words, the stochastic function r(xi|c) assigns
the noisy pixel xi + wi to its nearest neighbor.
Randomized mixture. The randomized mixture
(RandMix) defense selects cluster centers in the same
way as RandDisc, but rather than choosing a single
cluster center, it computes the weighted mean:
x˜i = m(xi|c) :=
∑k
j=1 cj · e−α‖xi+wi−cj‖
2
2∑k
j=1 e
−α‖xi+wi−cj‖22
, (3)
α > 0 is an inverse temperature parameter. When α→
∞, RandMix converges to RandDisc. Thus, RandMix
can be viewed as an approximation to RandDisc.
Since the function m(xi|c) is differentiable, we can use
PGD to generate adversarial examples for RandMix.
Furthermore, since RandMix is an approximation of
RandDisc, we expect the attack to transfer to RandDisc,
as long as α is reasonably large. Athalye el al. [2]
show that this approach successfully attacks established
defenses. We use it to evaluate RandDisc in Section 5.
4 Theoretical analysis
Consider any two images x and x′ satisfying
‖x− x′‖∞ ≤ . Think of x as a clean image and
x′ as the adversarially perturbed image. Let x˜ and x˜′
be the transformed versions of x and x′, generated by
one of the transformations in Section 3. Suppose that
x˜ is correctly classified by a base classifier f . In this
section, we derive a sufficient condition under which
the pre-processed perturbed image, namely x˜′ is also
correctly classified by the same base classifier f . This
conclusion certifies the robustness of the defense.
For arbitrary random variable u, we use pu to denote
its probability distribution (or its density function if
u is continuous). The KL divergence between two
distributions pu and pu′ is defined as:
DKL(pu‖pu′) :=
∫
pu(u) log
( pu(u)
pu′(u)
)
du.
We also define the total variation distance between two
distributions:
‖pu − pu′‖TV := 1
2
∫
|pu(u)− pu′(u)|du.
4.1 Upper bound on the KL divergence
A critical part of our analysis is an upper bound on the
KL divergence between the distributions of x˜ and x˜′.
We derive this bound for the Gaussian randomization
defense and the RandDisc defense.
Gaussian randomization. Using the decomposi-
tionality of KL divergence and the formula of KL di-
vergence between two normal distributions, we have:
DKL(px˜‖px˜′) =
n∑
i=1
DKL(px˜i‖px˜′i) =
n∑
i=1
‖xi − x′i‖22
2σ2
≤ nq
2
2σ2
, (4)
where the last inequality uses the fact that
‖xi − x′i‖∞ ≤ .
RandDisc. RandDisc adds a discrete filter on top
of the Gaussian randomization, which further reduces
the KL divergence. The following proposition presents
an upper bound. The proposition is proved by using
the properties of KL divergence and a data processing
inequality.
Proposition 1. Given hyperparameters (s, k, σ, τ) and
the number of channels q. the KL divergence between
x˜ and x˜′ can be upper bounded by
DKL(px˜‖px˜′) ≤ sq
2
2τ2
+
n∑
i=1
sup
∆∈[−,]q
Eu∼pc
[
DKL(pr(xi|u)‖pr(xi+∆|u))
]
. (5)
By Proposition 1, we compute the upper bound by
sampling “cluster centers” u, then compute the KL di-
vergence between two multinomial distributions (the
distributions of r(xi|u) and r(xi + ∆|u)). If the multi-
nomial distributions have no closed form, we draw
r(xi|u) and r(xi + ∆|u) many times, then compute
the KL divergence between the two empirical distribu-
tions (see [16] for a more efficient estimator for the KL
divergence).
The remaining problem is to compute the supremum
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over ∆ ∈ [−, ]q. We note that the supremum is
defined on a smooth function of ∆. As a result, the
function can be approximated by an expansion g>∆ +
O(∆2) for some gradient vector g. If  is small enough
(which is the case for our setting), then the supremum
must be achieved at a point where g>∆ is maximized,
and therefore must be at the vertices of [−, ]q. If
q = 3, it can be computed by simply enumerating the
23 = 8 possibilities.
If the relation Eu∼pc [DKL(pr(xi|u)‖pr(xi+∆|u))]  q
2
2σ2
holds on many pixels, then by comparing the right-
hand side of (4) and (5), we find that RandDisc’s upper
bound will be much smaller than that of the Gaussian
randomization. This happens if both xi and xi + ∆
are close to a particular cluster center, so that the dis-
tributions of both r(xi|u) and r(xi + ∆|u) concentrate
on the same point. We found that this property holds
on MNIST and ImageNet images.
4.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Notations. Let pv|u(·|u) be the distribution of an
arbitrary random variable v conditioning on the the
event u = u of random variable u. We define the KL
divergence between two conditional distributions pv|u
and pv′|u′ as:
DKL(pv|u‖pv′|u′) := Eu∼pu
[
DKL(pv|u(·|u)‖pv′|u′(·|u))
]
.
The chain rule of KL divergence states that:
DKL(pu,v‖pu′,v′) = DKL(pu‖pu′) + DKL(pv|u‖pv′|u′).
It implies the following inequality:
DKL(pv‖pv′) ≤ DKL(pv‖pv′) + DKL(pu|v‖pu′|v′)
= DKL(pu,v‖pu′,v′)
= DKL(pu‖pu′) + DKL(pv|u‖pv′|u′). (6)
As a special case, if u→ v and u′ → v′ are processed
by the same channel, then DKL(pv|u‖pv′|u′) = 0, so
that we have the following data processing inequality :
DKL(pv‖pv′) ≤ DKL(pu‖pu′).
Proof We use (i,b, c) and (i′,b′, c′) to represent the
vectors formed in the process of transforming x to x˜ and
transforming x′ to x˜′ (see Section 3). By inequality (6):
DKL(px˜‖px˜′) ≤ DKL(pc‖pc′) + DKL(px˜|c‖px˜′|c′).
Since the vectors c and c′ are selected by the same
algorithm given b and b′, the data processing inequality
implies:
DKL(pc‖pc′) ≤ DKL(pb‖pb′) =
s∑
j=1
DKL(pbj‖pb′j ),
where the last equation uses the fact that the sub-
vectors of b and b′ are independent. Note that the
sub-pixels of x˜ (conditioning on c) and x˜′ (conditioning
on c′) are also independent, thus we have:
DKL(px˜‖px˜′)
≤
s∑
j=1
DKL(pbj‖pb′j ) +
n∑
i=1
DKL(px˜i|c‖px˜′i|c′). (7)
For the first term on the right-hand size, inequality (6)
implies:
DKL(pbj‖pb′j ) ≤ DKL(pij‖pi′j ) + DKL(pbj |ij‖pb′j |i′j ).
Since DKL(pij‖pi′j ) is zero and DKL(pbj |ij‖pb′j |i′j ) is
bounded by q
2
2τ2 , we have:
DKL(pbj‖pb′j ) ≤
q2
2τ2
. (8)
For the second term on the right-hand side of (7), using
the fact that xi is -close to x′i in the `∞-norm, we have:
DKL(px˜i|c‖px˜′i|c′)
≤ sup
∆∈[−,]q
Eu∼pc [DKL(pr(xi|u)‖pr(xi+∆|u))], (9)
where the function r is defined in Section 3. Combining
inequalities (7)–(9), we obtain:
DKL(px˜‖px˜′) ≤ sq
2
2τ2
+
n∑
i=1
sup
∆∈[−,]q
Eu∼pc
[(
DKL(pr(xi|u)‖pr(xi+∆|u))
)]
,
which completes the proof.
4.2 Certified accuracy
Next, we translate the KL divergence bound (between
transformed image distributions) to a bound on classi-
fication accuracy. Consider an arbitrary base classifier
f : Rn → N and let y ∈ N be the ground truth label.
We define the margin of classification to be the proba-
bility of predicting the correct label y, subtracted by
the maximal probability of predicting a wrong label.
Formally,
margin(x˜, y, f) := P (f(x˜) = y)−max
z 6=y
P (f(x˜) = z).
(10)
Let x˜ and x˜′ be two images transformed from x and x′.
By simple algebra, the margin can be related to the
total variation distance:
|margin(x˜′, y, f)−margin(x˜, y, f)| ≤ 2 ‖pf(x˜) − pf(x˜′)‖TV.
Using Pinsker’s inequality and the data processing
inequality (see Section 4.1.1), we obtain:
|margin(x˜′, y, f)−margin(x˜, y, f)|
≤
√
2DKL(pf(x˜)‖pf(x˜′))
≤
√
2DKL(px˜‖px˜′).
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Equivalently, the above inequality implies:
margin(x˜′, y, f) ≥ margin(x˜, y, f)−
√
2DKL(px˜‖px˜′).
This implies that if DKL(px˜‖px˜′) is strictly smaller than
1
2 (margin(x˜, y, f))
2, then the classifier’s probability of
making the correct prediction will be greater than any
incorrect probability. Consequently, we can evaluate
f(x˜′) multiple times and use majority voting to retrieve
the correct label. By applying the union bound and
Hoeffding’s inequality, we obtain the following proposi-
tion:
Proposition 2. Consider running a Gaussian defense
or a RandDisc defense on a k-category classification
instance for m independently times. Let UKL(x) be the
KL divergence upper bound obtained from (4) or (5).
If
δ := UKL(x)− 1
2
(margin(x˜, y, f))2 > 0, (11)
then the most frequent output label is correct with prob-
ability at least 1− ke−2mδ2 .
We define the certified accuracy of a defense to be the
fraction of examples that satisfy the condition (11).
It can be numerically computed by computing the
KL divergence bound (4) or (5), and the margin of
classification (10).
5 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate our defenses against white-
box projected gradient descent (PGD) attacks on the
MNIST and the ImageNet datasets. We follow Athalye
et al. [2] to construct the strongest possible attack.
In particular, if the defense is non-differentiable, then
we attack a differentiable approximation of it. If the
defense is stochastic, then in each round we average mul-
tiple independent copies of the gradients to perform
the PGD. The combination of these techniques was
shown to successfully attack many existing defenses.
For the cluster selection algorithm of RandDisc and
RandMix, we use an adaptive sampling algorithm that
mimics the k-means++ initialization but doesn’t in-
volve the non-differentiable updates of k-means1. Each
cluster center cj is sampled from {b1, . . . , bs} under the
following distribution:
P (cj = b) ∝ eγmin`∈{1,...,j−1} ‖c`−b‖22 , b ∈ {b1, . . . , bs}.
By construction, points that are far from the existing
centers {c1, . . . , cj−1} will be more likely to be selected.
Assuming that the pixel values belong to [0, t], we
set s = 100 and γ = 40t2 for the selection algorithm,
1For evaluation purpose, we make the defense differen-
tiable, so that it can be effectively attacked by PGD. In
practice, one could use the iterative k-means++ to obtain
better clusters.
Figure 2: Accuracies under a whitebox attack on
MNIST. The plot compares the base CNN (no defense),
the Gaussian defense, the RandDisc defense and the
RandMix defense.
and set α = 40t2 for RandMix to make sure that it is
differentiable.
5.1 MNIST
The MNIST test set consists of 10,000 examples. We
use the normally-trained CNN of [24] as the base classi-
fier. The model reaches 99.2% accuracy on the test set.
Each pixel in the input image is normalized to interval
[0, 1]. All our defenses select k = 2 clusters (because
the images are black-and-white) and use τ = σ = 0.15
as the noise scale. The adversary runs 40 iterations
of PGD. We compute 20 independent copies of the
stochastic gradient in each iteration of PGD, and take
their mean to execute one PGD step. We attack Rand-
Mix as a proxy to evaluate the robustness of RandDisc.
Results. The results under whitebox attack are pre-
sented in Figure 2. The Gaussian defense consistently
outperforms the base classifier, confirming the bene-
fits of randomization. The difference is significant on
 ∈ {0.07, 0.1}. Both RandDisc and RandMix (whose
curves overlap) are substantially more accurate than
Gaussian. In particular, RandDisc achieves 94.4% ac-
curacy for  = 0.1, which exceeds the 84% accuracy
of [30], the 91% accuracy of [31] and the 93.8% accu-
racy of [39]. These later models provide theoretical
certificates, but require re-training the model. We also
note that Gowal et al. [13] proposed an interval bound
propagation method to derive a tighter upper bound on
the worst-case loss. Optimizing this relaxation achieves
97.7% certified accuracy on MNIST.
Interestingly, on the adversarially-trained (against
PGD) model of [24], our stochastic defenses actually
hurt robustness. This might be due to the fact that the
adversarially-trained model is crafted for the original
input distribution. The model is already quite robust,
achieving 92.7% accuracy under the PGD attack for
 = 0.3. Our defense modifies the input distribution,
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condition filter size stride
 ∈ (0, 0.02] 1 1
 ∈ (0.02, 0.05] 1 2
 ∈ (0.05, 0.07] 2 3
 ∈ (0.07, 0.1] 2 4
 ∈ (0.1, 0.3] 2 7
Table 1: For each adversary condition , this table
shows the filter size and stride of the downsampling
operator.
(a) with downsampling (b) without downsampling
Figure 3: Certified and empirical accuracy of RandDisc
under the whitebox attack on MNIST.
and consequently slightly lowers this particular model’s
accuracy which is optimized for the original distribu-
tion.
Certified accuracy. The Gaussian randomization
defense, due to its overly loose KL divergence bound,
has very low certified accuracy compared to its empiri-
cal accuracy against white-box attacks. See Section 4.1
for an explanation of why its KL divergence bound can
be much worse than that of RandDisc. Thus we focus
on the certified accuracy of RandDisc.
We report results on the vanilla RandDisc as well as
a down-sampled variant of it. For the down-sampled
version, given image x, we feed it into a max-pooling
layer to obtain a smaller image xs. Then we feed xs to
RandDisc, then resize it back to 28x28 using bilinear
interpolation before feeding to the base classifier. Note
that max-pooling never increases the perturbation scale.
Thus, the adversary can perturb xs by at most .
To analyze this variant, we treat xs as the input image,
and consider the following new base classifier: it is
the pipeline consisting of bilinear interpolation and
the old base classifier. The new base classifier takes
down-sampled images xs as input. As a consequence,
we can use the same technique to compute the certified
accuracy of this defense. The only difference is that
the KL divergence bound is computed on the smaller
image xs instead of x. Since xs has fewer pixels, it
results in a lower KL divergence bound, and thus a
higher certified accuracy provided the down-sampling
parameters are properly chosen. The filter size and the
stride are selected as a function of the perturbation
scale, as reported in Table 1.
Figure 3 plots the certified accuracy under various per-
turbation scales. With down-sampling, the certified
accuracy is consistently higher than the accuracy of
the base classifier, confirming that the worst-case per-
formance of the defense is better than the empirical
performance of the model without the defense. With-
out down-sampling, the certified accuracy decreases,
but the empirical accuracy increases. This suggests
that the theoretical lower bound still has much room
for improvement.
5.2 ImageNet
We report experiments on a subset of ImageNet used
by the NIPS 2017 Adversarial Attacks & Defenses chal-
lenge [20]. The dataset contains 1,000 images from
1,001 categories. Each RGB channel is an integer be-
tween 0 and 255. We use a pre-trained InceptionResNet-
V2 model [36] as the base classifier. The classifier is
trained on the standard ImageNet training set. We
note that the competition has removed images that
were frequently misclassified by state-of-the-art neural
models even without perturbation. The base classifier
achieves 99.3% accuracy on the resulting dataset.
We compare our defenses with four transformation-
based defenses that require no retraining:
• BitDepth [41]: reduce the bit-depth of each RGB
channel from 8 bits to 2 bits by quantification.
• JPEG [11]: JPEG compression and decompression
with a compression ratio of 4.
• Total variation minimization (TVM) [15]:
compute a denoised image z by minimizing the
following objective function:
`(z) :=
1
2
‖z − x‖22 + λ · TV(z),
where TV(z) stands for the total variation of image
z. We choose λ = 0.2 and perform 20 iterations of
gradient descent to approximate the minimization.
• ResizePadding [40]: resize the image to a random
size between 310 and 331, then pads zeros around
the image in a random manner, so that the final
image is of size 331× 331.
The adversary generates adversarial examples by run-
ning 10 iterations of PGD on each image to attack the
respective defense. To attack BitDepth, JPEG and
TVM, we define their differentiable approximations
by replacing step functions by σ(αt), where σ is the
logistic function and α is the same as in RandMix.
The Gaussian defense uses noise level σ = 32. Both
RandDisc and RandMix select k = 5 cluster centers per
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image, and use τ = σ = 32. For attacking stochastic
models, we compute 100 independent copies of the
stochastic gradients in each iteration of PGD, then use
their empirical mean to execute the PGD step. This
results in a strong whitebox attack at the cost of 100x
computation time.
Results. We evaluate all defenses on perburbation
scales  ∈ {1, 2, 4}. The results are reported on Ta-
ble 2(a). Both RandDisc and RandMix consistently
outperform other defenses, demonstrating the benefit
of combining randomization and discretization. For
the rest of this subsection, we study the impact of
various factors on accuracy. For each setting of hyper-
parameters (e.g., noise scale and cluster number), we
generate adversarial examples with respect to those
hyperparameters. When the results of both RandDisc
and RandMix are available, we report the result of
RandMix.
Effect of noise. To understand the effect of noise, we
very the noise parameter σ from 0 to 64. The accuracies
are plotted in Figure 4(a). We find that both methods
hit very low accuracies when there is no noise (σ = 0).
This confirms that the random noise is important for
our defense. The maximal accuracy of RandMix is 7.4%
higher than that of Gaussian randomization, meaning
that the discretization filter helps even if the noise scale
is optimized.
Effect of clusters. In Figure 4(b), we plot the accu-
racy as a function of the number of clusters k. With
more clusters, the classifier’s accuracy on clean images
increases, but its robustness drops. There is a certain
point where the accuracy and the robustness reach an
optimal trade-off.
An alternative cluster selection algorithm is to make
cluster centers image-independent. To understand this
approach, we select eight fixed colors of {64, 192}3 as
pre-defined RGB centers to evaluate RandMix. With
these pre-defined cluster centers, the accuracy of Rand-
Mix drops from (60.3%, 48.8%, 30.5%) to (51.7%,
33.6%, 15.9%) for  ∈ {1, 2, 4}, respectively. This
highlights the necessity of our adaptive clustering algo-
rithm.
Effect of stochastic gradients. Figure 4(c) shows
that averaging more gradients indeed make the attack
much stronger, but on both Gaussian and RandMix,
the marginal utility diminishes. The decision of av-
eraging 100 gradients is made based on a trade-off
between optimizing the attacking strength given our
computational resources.
Effect of loss function. Our attack maximizes the
cross-entropy loss. An alternative loss function is pro-
posed by Carlini and Wagner [6], which target at mis-
classification with high confidence. On this alternative
loss, we rerun the PGD attack with confidence parame-
ter κ = 50 (same as [24]). RandMix achieves accuracies
61.0%, 49.0% and 26.4% on  = {1, 2, 4}, respectively.
This is similar to the numbers in Table 2(a), confirm-
ing that our defense is stable under attacks optimizing
different losses.
Adversarially-trained model. If we take an adver-
sarially trained model as the base classifier, then our
defense can be even stronger. Specifically, we take
an InceptionResNet-V2 model adversarially-trained
against the FGSM attack2 [38]. The model itself is
vulnerable to the iterative PGD attack: its whitebox
accuracies are (18.4%, 10.7%, 5.8%) on  ∈ {1, 2, 4}.
However, after integrating with RandMix, the accura-
cies increase dramatically to (62.9%, 54.2%, 39.5%),
surpassing the best accuracies (Table 2(a)). This ob-
servation is the opposite of that on MNIST, where
our stochastic defenses actually hurt the adversarially-
trained model. We speculate that the adversarially-
trained model on ImageNet is much weaker compared
to the one on MNIST, and thus our stochastic defenses
have room to improve.
Certified accuracy. We compute the certified accu-
racies of Gaussian randomization and RandDisc, follow-
ing the method of Section 4. The KL divergence bound
for RandDisc is about 1/3 of that for the Gaussian
randomization, but as Figure 4(d) shows, the certified
accuracy of both defenses are non-vacuous only on very
small perturbations ( < 0.1). This is due to the fact
that our KL divergence bound is the sum of the KL di-
vergence bounds on individual pixels. Since ImageNet
is much higher resolution than MNIST, it leads to a
loose cumulative bound.
Results on the NIPS 2017 competition. Finally,
we evaluated our defenses against the strongest attacks
in the NIPS 2017 Adversarial Attacks & Defenses com-
petition [20]. We downloaded the source code of the
top 3 attacks on the final leaderboard to generate ad-
versarial examples. The perturbation scale is set to
 = 8. On these examples, we compare our defenses
with the top 3 defenses on the final leaderboard.
As the base classifier, we use the adversarially-trained
InceptionResNet-V2 model obtained through ensemble
adversarial training against the FGSM attack, which
is publicly available [38]. Since the NIPS attacks are
generally weaker than the whitebox attack, we use a
lower noise level τ = σ = 16, and k = 10 clusters
to preserve more information about the image. We
also report BitDepth, JPEG and TVM, but ignore
ResizePadding because the 2nd defense is exactly the
same as ResizePadding.
2[38] report that the adversarial training fails against
the PGD attack.
Defending against Whitebox Adversarial Attacks
 = 1  = 2  = 4
Base Classifier 16.0% 6.0% 2.3%
BitDepth 20.4% 8.7% 3.4%
JPEG 22.4% 9.9% 4.5%
TVM 25.5% 10.2% 4.2%
ResizePadding 30.7% 9.8% 2.3%
Gaussian 57.3% 29.9% 11.4%
RandDisc 56.0% 46.0% 29.4%
RandMix 60.7% 48.3% 28.3%
Attack: 1st 2nd 3rd Mean
1st defense 87.3% 44.1% 33.8% 55.1%
2nd defense 57.3% 28.3% 63.9% 49.8%
3rd defense 54.7% 27.7% 61.1% 47.8%
BitDepth 61.2% 61.3% 69.9% 64.0%
JPEG 65.0% 51.0% 21.3% 45.8%
TVM 58.6% 52.0% 62.6% 57.7%
Gaussian 69.1% 66.3% 69.1% 68.2%
RandDisc 72.4% 69.0% 75.9% 72.4%
RandMix 69.8% 67.2% 76.2% 71.1%
(a) Against whitebox PGD attack (b) Against winning attacks of NIPS 2017 competition
Table 2: Accuracies on the ImageNet subset of 1,000 images (NIPS Adversarial Attacks & Defenses competition).
(a) effect of noise (b) effect of clusters (c) effect of stochastic grad. (d) certified accuracy
Figure 4: On the ImageNet subset (perturbation scale set to  = 1 for (a)–(c)). (a), (b): adding noise or using
less clusters increases robustness, but hurts accuracy on clean images; (c): the marginal utility of averaging more
stochastic gradients diminishes; (d): Gaussian randomization and RandDisc are provably robust for small enough
.
The results are reported in Table 2(b). We notice that
the first defense is particularly strong against the first
attack. It is potentially due to the fact that they are
submitted by the same team, and according to the
team’s report [21], the defense is trained explicitly to
eliminate that particular attack. Nevertheless, Rand-
Disc is at least 35% better than the top 3 defenses in
the worst case, and at least 18% better in the average
case.
On clean images, RandDisc and RandMix exhibit lower
accuracies (88.6% and 92.7%) than the base classifier
(97.1%). This is due to the effect of the random noise
and the discretization. An open challenge is to make
RandDisc robust against adversarial attacks without
sacrificing the base classifier’s clean-image accuracy.
6 Discussion
The idea of injecting randomness has been explored by
previous work on robust classification. Gu et al. [14]
study injecting Gaussian noise as a blackbox defense
for MNIST, but they report disappointing results. This
is consistent with our observation on MNIST that the
Gaussian randomization’s robustness is significantly
weaker than that of RandDisc. Guo et al. [15] propose
that certain stochastic transformations can help defend
against greybox attacks. Dhillon et al. [9] propose to
use stochastic activation functions, and evaluate the
model on CIFAR-10. However, none of them demon-
strates whitebox robustness on ImageNet. Buckman
et al. [4] propose a discrete transformation based on
one-hot encodings, and report its whitebox robustness
on MNIST and CIFAR-10. However, Athalye et al. [2]
show that it can be broken by attacking the differen-
tiable approximation. Kannan [17] proposed the logit
pairing defense. They show that logit pairing exhibits
better robustness than adversarial training on Ima-
geNet. These results are based on defending against
targeted attacks, while in our experiment setting, we
defend against untargeted attacks.
In this paper, we have proposed randomized discretiza-
tion as a defense, and have tried our best to attack it to
empirically evaluate its robustness on ImageNet. Our
theoretical analysis provides an information-theoretic
perspective to understanding stochastic defenses, and is
complementary to existing certificates for deterministic
classifiers, which rely on optimizing a relaxation of the
worst-case loss [30, 39, 31, 13].
Reproducibility. Code, data, and experiments for
this paper are available on the CodaLab platform:
https://worksheets.codalab.org/worksheets/
0x822ba2f9005f49f08755a84443c76456/.
Yuchen Zhang, Percy Liang
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